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Abstract
A growth in the number of hate groups that operate in the United States over the
past decade counters many researchers‟ claims that overt prejudice and discrimination no
longer have influence. In this thesis, we explore how people react with moral outrage and
moral cleansing toward hate groups‟ moral transgressions of racial egalitarianism—a
strong sacred value among those who desire group-based equality. Across two
experiments, we find that people perceive hate groups as immoral social agents, and
people express moral outrage against them. We also find that people who were morally
contaminated by hate groups (i.e., by being led to believe that they share compatible
ideological beliefs with hate groups) perceived more racism in their environments than
people who are not morally contaminated by hate groups. We discuss implications for
confronting prejudice, theoretical debates on moral licensing and moral cleansing, and
engaging in progressive action to improve intergroup relations.
Keywords: Racism, Morality, Hate Groups, Discrimination
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The Morally Contaminating (and Motivating) Influence of Hate Groups in the U.S.
Hate groups such as the Ku Klux Klan may seem to be a vestige of a racist past,
but the number of hate groups in the U.S. has increased by over 50% since 2000 (Potok,
2009). Despite their growing popularity, we predict that many people view these groups
as a threat to society's moral integrity, so exposure to hate groups may cause people to
react with moral outrage (Fiske & Tetlock, 1997) and engage in seemingly redundant
moral cleansing processes (i.e., moral overkill; Tetlock, Kristel, Elson, Lerner, & Green,
2000). However, there are theoretical reasons to believe that merely expressing outrage
toward hate groups is not sufficient for motivating action or vigilance against them
because in expressing outrage, people earn a moral license as nonracist and no longer
need to show that they are nonracist (e.g., Merritt, Effron, & Monin, 2010; Monin &
Miller, 2001). Even though overt forms of prejudice and racism are taboo and discredited
in contemporary society, they continue to flourish in some circles, and may produce
unintended tolerance of racism even among those who disapprove of them. It may
therefore be important to understand how people can remain vigilant to prejudice even if
they reject its overt expressions.
An unsettled question is whether morality-based reactions toward hate groups will
lead to vigilance against racism. Different theories make conflicting predictions. The
sacred value protection model (Tetlock et al., 2000) suggests that racial equality may be a
sacred value (i.e., a value not subject to qualification or equivocation) among those who
value racial egalitarianism. Whenever sacred values are violated (e.g., by hate groups),
people may feel morally contaminated and may react toward the violator (e.g., a hate
group) with moral outrage, and seek to morally cleanse themselves by seeking
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opportunities to rid themselves of the contamination. According to the moral credentials
model, rejecting hate groups could socially license people as non-racist, so they may not
need to perceive racism in their environments to demonstrate their non-racism (Monin &
Miller, 2001). According to the overkill hypothesis in the sacred value protection model,
however, exposure to hate groups may make people overreact with several redundant
moral defense strategies (i.e., even more moral outrage and moral cleansing), which
would make them perceive racism in their environments (Tetlock et al., 2000). Thus, it
remains unclear whether expressing the view that hate groups are immoral will make one
sensitive to prejudice or not. The present thesis tests whether hate groups have power and
influence to increase tolerance of racism even though people may reject them as immoral
social agents. We also test whether making people aware of this hateful contamination in
their lives may increase the likelihood that they recognize prejudice and protest against it.
In the present research, we explore people‟s perceptions of and reactions toward
hate groups in the United States at present. We begin with an analysis of the current state
of hate groups in the U.S. along with an examination of the hate groups‟ belief systems
and ideologies. We suggest that hate groups, who are mostly white supremacist groups,
provide an ideological contrast to racial egalitarianism and thus by definition violate the
principle of racial egalitarianism. We then explore morality-based reactions people may
experience after exposure to hate groups such as the Ku Klux Klan. When people who
value egalitarian group relations feel as though they share similar beliefs and opinions as
a hate group, they can be morally contaminated and thus motivated to morally cleanse
themselves. We then propose two experiments to explore how people perceive and react
to hate groups.
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Perceiving Subtle Racism
Prejudice and discrimination cannot be separated from their social, cultural, and
historical contexts. From the times of the pre-Civil Rights era in the 1950s and 1960s to
contemporary society, psychologists have claimed that the nature of prejudice has
changed (see Duckitt, 1992). In this “new” era of racial politics, psychologists have
suggested that prejudice operates from at least two levels (i.e., the explicit and implicit;
Dovidio, Kawakami, Johnson, Johnson, & Howard, 1997), and the “new” form of
prejudice is subtle and covert (Dovidio & Gaertner, 1986; Meertens & Pettigrew, 1997).
Some research, for example, has shown that people are not even aware of some
stereotypes that have existed for centuries (e.g., Negro-Ape metaphor; Goff, Eberhardt,
Williams, & Jackson, 2008). These findings suggest that people may be detached from
the issues of race and racism in U.S. society, and this detachment may be explained by
the subtle and covert form of racism. The end of de jure racial discrimination makes it
difficult for people to literally see how people and institutions continue to discriminate
against people of color in the United States because there are very few physical, visual
symbols of institutionalized or individual racism (e.g., “Whites Only” signs). People may
therefore be less vigilant to racism because perceiving subtle racism is difficult.
The end of overt and legal racial discrimination can make it difficult for people to
label acts of racism that might find their way into political discourse. Thus, when
attempting to understand arguments in debates of public policy (e.g., affirmative action,
immigration, and so on), people may be unaware of or unsure of the racist content in
political discourse. Although there may be principled reasons for arguing against policies
aimed at achieving racial equality (e.g., affirmative action and principled conservatism;
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Sniderman, Piazza, Tetlock, & Kendrick, 1991), these types of political discourse
typically have racist and group dominance-related undercurrents (Federico & Sidanius,
2002; Sidanius, Pratto, & Bobo, 1996). The arguments and messages that hate groups
promote can find their way into political discourse, and people may be unaware of the
source of these arguments. Ultimately, these arguments are based in racism. It may be
important to understand how people increase their vigilance against subtle and covert
forms of prejudice and racism by elucidating the racist sources of the political discourse
surrounding various public policies.
Hate Groups in the United States
Even though contemporary research on prejudice stresses the covert nature of
racism (e.g., Dovidio & Gaertner, 1986; Meertens & Pettigrew, 1997), overt forms of
racism and prejudice still exist in contemporary society (Leach, 2005; Sidanius & Pratto,
1999). Hate groups, for example, may represent the last stand of the formal, overt
prejudice and discrimination that people believe have been eliminated since the U.S.
Civil Rights Movement. Hate groups are hierarchy-enhancing social agents (see Sidanius
& Pratto, 1999, p. 38) because their presence in the U.S. and around the world contributes
to group-based social hierarchy and increased prejudice and discrimination. Thus,
understanding how these prejudiced social groups can increase prejudice in society even
in a society that is intolerant of overt racism may be important in understanding how even
overt forms of prejudice can still successfully operate in contemporary society.
Hate groups are organizations whose “beliefs and practices...attack or malign an
entire class of people, typically for their immutable characteristics” (Southern Poverty
Law Center, 2010). Hate groups‟ mission statements overtly identify social groups they
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find to be problematic and blatantly advocate discrimination against those social groups
(e.g., deportation, isolation, or extermination). Hate groups can also be identified by
exploring various ideological patterns that are common to all hate groups (i.e.,
conspiracism, dualism, and apocalypticism; Berlet & Vysotsky, 2006). In 2000, 602 hate
groups were active in the U.S., and in 2009, 932 hate groups were active in the U.S.
(Potok, 2010)—an average growth of more than 30 hate groups per year. Compiling
population data from the 2010 U.S. Census and from the Southern Poverty Law Center‟s
(SPLC) count of the number of hate groups in the U.S., there are on average four hate
groups for every one million people in the United States. The SPLC—an anti-hate group
organization—suggests that the recent trend in hate groups is a growth in antigovernment militia groups (Potok, 2010). Other more historical hate groups currently
operate in the U.S. including the Ku Klux Klan, National Socialist Workers Party (Nazi
Party), and Skinheads.
Hate groups share an ideological pattern that emphasizes conspiracism, dualism,
and apocalypticism (Berlet & Vysotsky, 2006). Conspiracism is the belief that major
historical events are caused by some conspiracy of elite groups in society trying to
maintain their control of all citizens. Hate groups believe that all people are dichotomized
into “good” and “evil,” and their group‟s members are good while everyone else is evil
(i.e., dualism). Finally, members of hate groups believe that an imminent war between
groups will force hate group members to fight against those they hate, so they are
preparing for the war by recruiting members and disseminating propaganda (i.e.,
apocalypticism; Berlet & Vysotsky, 2006). These three components of hate groups‟
ideologies oppose hierarchy-attenuating ideologies of egalitarianism and universalism.
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Hate groups can be separated into three very broad categories, which are not
always distinct from one another. Political hate groups generally derive their ideologies
from Nazi and neo-Nazi doctrine, and their group‟s organizational structure reflects their
authoritarian and hierarchical ideology (Berlet & Vysotsky, 2006). These political hate
groups believe in the inherent superiority of the White race over all others and believe
that all other races should be either removed from existence or deported from the country
in order to protect white culture. These groups are nationalist and invest in the promotion
of a purely white society, so they promote ingroup favoritism, reject interracial
interactions (e.g., immigration and especially miscegenation; Glaser, Dixit, & Green,
2002), and decry perceived attempts at disadvantaging the white race (e.g., affirmative
action).
Religious hate groups, on the other hand, derive their ideologies from religious
doctrine and orthodoxy, and they use religion to legitimize their hateful, discriminatory
stance against outgroup members (Berlet & Vysotsky, 2006). Some examples of these
groups include Christian Identity, Creativity Movement, and the White Order of Thule.
The Christian Identity Movement, for example, believes that white European people from
Great Britain and Germany are God‟s chosen people, and they also believe that Jewish
people are the descendants of Satan and Eve from the Garden of Eden (Berlet &
Vysotsky, 2006). Christian Identity followers also believe that Jews install blacks and
other people of color in positions of power in order to prepare for the race war that will
come as prophesized in the book of Revelations in the Christian Bible (Berlet &
Vysotsky, 2006).
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The third broad category is the youth cultural sector, which is a relatively
informal type of hate group (Berlet & Vysotsky, 2006). These groups include Skinheads,
Black Metal (a hateful musical propaganda group), and other informal hate movements.
The Skinheads represent a countercultural, youth movement, which has its origins in
punk rock from England. Skinheads attend parties and rallies and attack outgroup
members without notice or pre-planning (Schafer & Navarro, 2003). These various types
of hate groups represent a social movement in the U.S. that seeks to eradicate outgroup
members and promote an ingroup identity that derives its self-perceived “legitimacy”
from hierarchy-enhancing ideologies that promote prejudice and discrimination. The
ideologies that hate groups follow contradict and violate racial egalitarianism, which is a
sacred value held by many people in the United States.
Morality-Based Reactions to Hate Groups
Some values that people hold cannot be violated under any circumstances (e.g.,
assessing the monetary worth of human life; Fiske & Tetlock, 1997) whereas other values
can be acceptable under certain circumstances (e.g., lying). When people‟s sacred values
are threatened (e.g., hate groups threaten racial egalitarianism), they can become intuitive
moralists-theologians, who engage in a struggle to be morally clean and avoid morally
contaminating thoughts or behaviors. People who experience actual or perceived moral
contamination engage in moral outrage and moral cleansing (Tetlock, Kristel, Elson,
Lerner, & Green, 2000).
For a variety of reasons including the U.S.‟s history of race relations, racial
equality has become a sacred value that should not be violated under any circumstances.
It can be taboo for some people to blatantly advocate racial inequality (Monin & Miller,
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2001; Plant & Devine, 2009). For example, people who are asked to set prices for
insurance policies in different communities express moral outrage and moral cleansing
when they discover that the insurance prices would differentially affect black and white
customers (Tetlock et al., 2000). The sacred value protection model (Tetlock et al., 2000)
provides a theoretical basis for understanding how people may react to violators of racial
equality with moral outrage and moral cleansing among people who value group-based
equality. Because the vast majority of hate groups blatantly attempt to disadvantage racial
minorities, they may be perceived as immoral social agents by people who value groupbased equality, and those people may express moral outrage against them.
Racist hate groups (e.g., the Ku Klux Klan and Skinheads) by definition violate
racial egalitarianism, so people who desire and value group-based equality may react
toward these groups with moral outrage and moral cleansing. Moral outrage is
conceptualized to have three components that are based in affective, cognitive, and
behavioral reactions toward a violator of a sacred value. These include (1) harsh
dispositional attributions, (2) anger, contempt, and/or disgust toward the violator, and (3)
support for punishing the violator (Tetlock et al., 2000). When people feel as though they
are morally contaminated by a violator of a sacred value, they may engage in moral
cleansing. Even the mere contemplation of a sacred value violation can be morally
contaminating for people (Tetlock et al., 2000). Moral cleansing is closely related to selfaffirmation processes (see Steele, 1988) in which people attempt to rid themselves of a
moral contaminant by reaffirming themselves as moral. However, in contrast to Steele‟s
(1988) contention that people can affirm other unrelated aspects of the self to resolve any
conflicts between cognitions or behavior and cognition, people attempt to rid themselves
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of a moral contaminant by directly addressing their moral failing. Thus, when people who
value equal group relations violate racial egalitarianism, they should be motivated to
repair their moral failing in race relations and may thus perceive more racism in their
environments.
When people encounter immoral social agents, they may respond with moral
outrage and moral cleansing, which may have different consequences for being attuned to
other moral contaminants in their environments. People who are morally contaminated by
an immoral social agent may be motivated to morally cleanse themselves, and this
motivation is hypothesized to increase people‟s vigilance to opportunities to directly
confront the contaminant (cf. Steele, 1988; Tetlock et al., 2000). In the case of hate
groups and racism, people who are morally contaminated by hate groups‟ presence or an
association with the group (e.g., sharing the same beliefs as hate groups) may then be
motivated to morally cleanse themselves by seeking opportunities to condemn racism or
racist people and institutions. Contaminated people may then be more vigilant to racism
in their environments; they may need to show that they are aware of and reject racism.
Failures to perceive racism are major deterrents to confronting prejudice (AshburnNardo, Morris, & Goodwin, 2008).
In addition to this heightened vigilance against racism for those who are
motivated to morally cleanse themselves, there is a debate relevant to how vigilant people
will be to racism after they have expressed moral outrage and anger-based responses.
Tetlock et al. (2000) outline two possible strategies people use when confronted with a
moral contaminant such as hate groups: moral compensation or moral overkill. According
to the compensatory hypothesis, people express moral outrage that attempts to distance
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themselves from the contaminant. People therefore compensate for the contaminant by
directly rejecting it, and they no longer need to do anything else because they adequately
compensated for its contaminating influence. This compensatory hypothesis has been
supported by a variety of research on people who deal with potential moral failings (e.g.,
Monin & Miller, 2001; Sachdeva, Iliev, & Medin, 2009; Schnall, Benton & Harvey,
2008; Zhong & Liljenquist, 2006). People who feel morally affirmed or cleansed condone
future instances of immorality. Monin and Miller (2001) find support for a moral
credentials model in which people who have demonstrated that they are not racist or
sexist are more likely to be racist or sexist in future situations than people who did not
first establish themselves as nonprejudiced. We should expect then in line with this
compensatory hypothesis that expressing moral outrage against hate groups may relieve
people of being aware of future instances of racism. According to this compensatory
hypothesis, people who express moral outrage should be less vigilant to racism than
people who did not express moral outrage against a hate group.
There are theoretical reasons to believe, however, that expressing moral outrage
against a hate group (vs. not expressing moral outrage) may increase people‟s vigilance
against racism in their environments in the same manner that people who are motivated to
morally cleanse themselves are likely to be more vigilant to racism. According to the
overkill hypothesis, people engage in many and redundant moral reactions when faced
with a moral contaminant (Tetlock et al., 2000). Instead of being “done” after expressing
moral outrage against a moral contaminant (i.e., the compensatory hypothesis), people
may express even more moral outrage and also seek opportunities to morally cleanse
themselves despite having already expressed moral outrage. People may thus engage in
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these overkill moral responses when faced with a moral contaminant. The overkill
hypothesis is likely to be supported when expressing outrage or cleansing oneself is not
costly and when the moral contaminant is especially extreme in violating a sacred value.
Tetlock et al. (2000) find support for the overkill hypothesis when the sacred value
violator is especially egregious. The overkill hypothesis roughly maps onto the
predictions that would be made by research suggesting that catharsis is not effective in
alleviating aggressive thoughts and actions (Bushman, 2002). People when exposed to
hate groups will not merely express outrage and be done, but they will also express more
outrage later and seek opportunities to morally cleanse themselves. We should expect,
then, in line with the overkill hypothesis that people who express moral outrage against
hate groups will be more vigilant to racism in their environments than people who do not
express moral outrage against hate groups.
The Present Research
The present research examines how people perceive hate groups (e.g., as
immoral), react to hate groups (e.g., moral outrage and moral cleansing), and how people
who are contaminated by hate groups may be motivated to remain vigilant to racism. The
present research also compares predictions from two theoretical models that would make
opposite predictions. According to the moral credentials model (Monin & Miller, 2001),
people who have established themselves as moral by rejecting prejudice should no longer
be vigilant to prejudice and may actually behave in more prejudiced ways later. Thus,
people who express moral outrage against hate groups should perceive less racism in
their environments than people who have not been able to establish themselves as moral.
In contrast, the sacred value protection model (Tetlock et al., 2000) predicts an overkill
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hypothesis in which people who engage in moral outrage will perceive more racism in a
seemingly redundant defense of a moral contaminant. Also, people who are motivated to
morally cleanse themselves will perceive more racism in their environments in order to
directly confront racism.
Our reasoning here depends on the assumptions that hate groups are in fact
perceived to be immoral social agents and that people will express moral outrage toward
them. Experiment 1 tests these assumptions. Experiment 2 tests the prediction that when
hate groups morally contaminate people, they will subsequently recognize racism in their
environments more than people who have not been morally contaminated. People will
perceive more racism in their environments when they have become psychologically
associated with hate groups (i.e., morally contaminated by them) than people who have
not become morally contaminated by hate groups because they will be motivated to seek
opportunities to morally cleanse themselves. Also, with regard to the opposing
predictions of people‟s vigilance against racism after expressing moral outrage, we seek
to test whether the compensatory hypothesis or the overkill hypothesis are supported after
people express moral outrage against a hate group (Tetlock et al., 2000). The present
research explores how hate groups can make people more or less vigilant to racism in
their environments, which can have important implications for confronting prejudice and
seeking egalitarian group relations.
Pilot Study
We conducted a pilot study drawn from the same population as the experimental
participants to identify the groups with which our participants had the most familiarity
and could identify correctly. We included a variety of hate groups, politically liberal
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groups, and politically conservative groups to see if such groups are familiar to
participants and could correctly identify them as racist, liberal, or conservative.
Method
Participants. We recruited 67 undergraduate students to participate in this study
for partial fulfillment of a course requirement. Participants were 61% male, 81% white,
and 19 years old on average.
Procedure. Participants were invited to a large lecture room where they
completed ratings of 45 groups. We used the names of 15 hate groups identified by the
Southern Poverty Law Center. We identified another 15 groups that were politically
liberal organizations according to their self identification and from their mission
statements (e.g., MoveOn and League of Women Voters). We also identified 15 groups
that were politically conservative organizations according to their self identification and
from their mission statements (e.g., Focus on the Family and Alliance Defense Fund). We
administered four versions of the survey that randomly presented all 45 groups in four
different orders to participants.
Measures. Participants rated each group on how familiar, racist, liberal, and
conservative they thought each group was. They rated each group on a scale from 1 (not
at all familiar, racist, liberal, or conservative) to 7 (very familiar, racist, liberal, or
conservative).
Results and Discussion
Table 1 displays the complete listing of the groups that participants rated,
followed by the type of organization (i.e., hate, liberal, or conservative), descriptive
statistics of the measures for each group, and whether or not participants correctly

MORALLY CONTAMINATING HATE GROUPS

14

identified the organization‟s type (i.e., hate, liberal, or conservative). Participants
reported being familiar with six of the 45 groups, as indicated by familiarity scores above
the midpoint of the rating scale (i.e., greater than 3.5). Among the 39 groups that were
rated as unfamiliar, participants reported being equally unfamiliar with the hate
(M=1.81), liberal (M=1.70), and conservative (M=1.73) groups, F (2, 132) =1.54, p>.10.
Participants, in general, were unfamiliar with hate, liberal, and conservative groups,
which suggests that participants may not be vigilant to prejudice or bias because they do
not know what these political groups are.
Participants correctly classified the following six groups as racist, liberal, or
conservative. Skinheads were rated as more racist (M=6.28) than it was rated liberal
(M=2.55) and conservative (M=4.87), F (1, 61) = 131.09, p<.001, d=2.93. The Ku Klux
Klan was rated as more racist (M=6.55) than liberal (M=2.25) and conservative
(M=5.19), F (1, 63) = 146.29, p<.001, d=3.05. The Democratic Party was rated as more
liberal (M=6.02) than conservative (M=2.14) and racist (M=1.80), F (1, 64) = 334.07,
p<.001, d=4.57. Planned Parenthood was rated as more liberal (M=5.34) than
conservative (M=2.70) and racist (M=1.32), F (1, 62) = 107.21, p<.001, d=2.63. The
Republican Party was rated as more conservative (M=6.02) than liberal (M=2.18) and
racist (M=3.22), F (1, 64) = 158.89, p<.001, d=3.15. The National Rifle Association was
rated as more conservative (M=5.20) than liberal (M=2.90) and racist (M=2.37), F (1, 58)
= 174.04, p<.001, d=3.46. Participants were able to correctly identify the Ku Klux Klan
and Skinheads as racist organizations, which suggests that these groups are exemplars of
the hate group category for participants. This finding suggests that exposure to the Ku

MORALLY CONTAMINATING HATE GROUPS

15

Klux Klan and Skinheads could morally contaminate participants because participants
recognize them as racist organizations.
Experiment 1
Experiment 1 tests the basic assumptions and hypotheses that hate groups are seen
as immoral social agents, who will evoke moral outrage. We randomly assigned
participants to conditions in which they were told that an argument against immigration
came from either the KKK, Republican Party, or American Atheists in a betweensubjects design. The KKK was used to represent hate groups because they express a
variety of sociopolitical views, whereas Skinheads are not particularly political (Berlet &
Vysotsky, 2006). Also, the KKK was seen as an exemplar of racist organizations, as
identified in the pilot study, so they would be most likely to evoke moral outrage.
Because Americans view atheists as immoral social agents (Edgell, Gerteis, & Hartmann,
2006), we selected them as a control group in this experiment. If the KKK is seen as
more immoral than or just as immoral as atheists, then we would find convergent
evidence that the KKK is seen as an immoral social agent. The Republican Party was
selected as a third control group because they hold some of the same sociopolitical views
as the KKK (e.g., anti-immigration, anti-affirmative action, and so on), but they are not
overtly racist like the KKK. The inclusion of the Republican Party controls for the effect
of political conservatism in the perception of immorality and moral outrage against
violations to racial equality.
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Method
Participants. We recruited 85 undergraduate students who participated in this
experiment for partial course credit. Participants were 60% female, 77% white, and 19
years old on average.
Procedure. Participants read an argument in favor of anti-immigration policies,
which is shown in Appendix A. After participants read the argument, we measured moral
outrage against the groups and perceptions of morality. Participants completed
demographic information, the 16 item social dominance orientation scale (Pratto,
Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994), and a measure of political orientation. Participants
were debriefed and thanked for their time.
Measures. Participants completed measures of moral outrage, perceptions of
morality, social dominance orientation, and political orientation.
Moral Outrage. Participants completed a six item measure of moral outrage
(α=.91) adapted from Tetlock, Kristel, Elson, and Green (2000). Two items were selected
to represent each component of moral outrage and were rated on a scale from 1 to 7
(except for the second punish violator item indicated below) with different anchors for
each item, which are shown in brackets next. The items measuring harsh dispositional
attributions were “Someone who is willing to join this group is [very compassionate/very
cruel]” and “This group is [not at all offensive/highly offensive].” The items measuring
emotional responses to the group were “This group evokes [no anger/a great deal of
anger]” and “This group is [not at all offensive/highly offensive].” The items measuring
support for punishing the violator were “This group [should be banned/should be
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permitted]” and “I would like to [seek out/avoid] this group‟s company.” This latter item
was measured on a scale from 1 to 9.
Perceptions of Morality. Participants rated how immoral they thought the group
was with one item on a scale from 1 (highly moral) to 7 (highly immoral).
Social Dominance Orientation. Participants completed the 16 item social
dominance orientation scale (α=.87; Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994), which
has traditionally been used to measure the extent to which people desire unequal group
relations. This interpretation of the scale, however, focuses on only one pole of the scale.
For our purposes, we reverse coded the social dominance orientation scale to measure
how much people desire equal group relations. Participants rated these 16 items on a
scale from 1 (strongly oppose) to 7 (strongly favor), and example items include
“Increased social equality” and “Inferior groups should stay in their place.”
Political Orientation. Participants self reported their political orientation using
the political economic conservatism scale reported by Pratto et al. (1994). This scale
consisted of three items asking participants to indicate how liberal or conservative they
were on a scale from 1 (very liberal) to 7 (very conservative) on social, economic, and
foreign policy issues (α=.87).
Results
Table 2 displays the correlation matrix for all study variables both for the entire
sample and split by condition.
Perceptions of Morality. We conducted a one-way analysis of variance with the
source of the argument as the independent variable and perceptions of morality as the
dependent variable. We found a significant main effect for the source of the argument on
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perceptions of morality, F (2, 82) = 8.11, p<.001. Tukey multiple comparison tests reveal
that the Ku Klux Klan (M=5.72) was seen as more immoral than the Republican Party
(M=4.54) (d=.91; 95% confidence interval for the mean difference was .54, 1.84) and
American Atheists (M=4.64) (d=.79; 95% confidence interval for the mean difference
was .43, 1.73).
Because we expected that the KKK would represent a violator of the racial
equality sacred value, we predicted that the KKK would be seen as especially immoral
among people who desire equal group relations. Among the 85 participants in this study,
three participants fell below the midpoint of the social dominance orientation reverse
coded scale. Thus, it would not be radical to suggest that virtually all of our participants
value group-based equality. However, to compare participants who may moderately
desire group based equality to participants who extremely desire group based equality,
we ran regression analysis with indicator variables for each of the three conditions (i.e.,
KKK, Republican Party, and American Atheists), reverse coded social dominance
orientation, and the interactions between each condition indicator and social dominance
orientation. We centered social dominance orientation to avoid multicollinearity and to
aid in interpretation (see Jaccard, Wan, & Turrisi, 1990). We found that the KKK was
seen as more immoral than the Republican Party (β=.39, t(79)=3.49, p<.001) and
American Atheists (β=.34, t(79)=3.02, p<.01), controlling for the mean level of social
dominance orientation and the interaction effects. Figure 1 displays a box plot of our
results. Also, social dominance orientation was a significant predictor of how immoral
the groups were perceived. People who extremely desired equal group relations were
more likely to see each group as more immoral than people who moderately desired equal
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group relations, β=.22, p<.05. Social dominance orientation did not significantly interact
with any of the indicator variables for the experimental conditions, |t(79)|<1.
Moral Outrage. We conducted a one-way analysis of variance with the source of
the argument as the independent variable and moral outrage as the dependent variable.
We found a significant main effect for the source of the argument on perceptions of
morality, F (2, 82) = 14.28, p<.001. Tukey multiple comparison tests reveal that the Ku
Klux Klan (M=6.10) was seen as more immoral than the Republican Party (M=4.67)
(d=1.21; 95% confidence interval for the mean difference was .81, 2.06) and American
Atheists (M=4.63) (d=1.29; 95% confidence interval for the mean difference was .81,
2.10). The mean levels indicate that although participants expressed moral outrage
against all three groups on average, the Ku Klux Klan was rated extremely so by almost
all participants.
We wanted to test whether people who desire group-based equality would be
especially morally outraged against the KKK than they would be against the Republican
Party or American Atheists, which would be represented by a significant interaction
between social dominance orientation and experimental condition. Therefore, we
conducted a linear regression analysis with indicator variables for each of the three
conditions (i.e., KKK, Republican Party, and American Atheists), reverse coded social
dominance orientation, and the interactions between each condition indicator and social
dominance orientation. Again, we centered social dominance orientation. Figure 2
displays a box plot of our results. We found that people expressed more moral outrage
against the KKK than against the Republican Party (β=.44, t(81)=4.54, p<.001) and
American Atheists (β=.44, t(81)=4.46, p<.001), controlling for the mean level of social
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dominance orientation and the interaction effects. The interaction effects between social
dominance orientation and the indicator variables for the sources of the argument were
not significant, |t(81)|<1. Participants who strongly desire equal group relations were
more likely to express moral outrage against all groups than participants who moderately
desired equal group relations, β=.42, p<.01.
Discussion
Consistent with our hypotheses, participants saw the KKK as more immoral than
the Republican Party and American Atheists, even though the same policy ideas were
attributed to each group. Because atheists are already seen as immoral in the U.S. (Edgell,
Gerteis, & Hartmann, 2006), we found support for the idea that hate groups are seen as
immoral because they were seen as even more immoral than atheists. Participants also
expressed more moral outrage against the KKK than toward the Republican Party and
American Atheists, even though the argument against immigration attributed to each
group was the same. Participants who valued group equality were more likely to view
each group as immoral and to express moral outrage than participants who did not value
group equality as much. These findings suggest that among those people who value group
equality, the KKK can evoke moral outrage because they are seen as immoral for
violating the racial equality sacred value. Because participants read an argument against
immigration to the U.S., all sources of the arguments (i.e., KKK, Republican Party, and
American Atheists) violated the racial equality sacred value, which may explain the lack
of an interaction between social dominance orientation and the source of the arguments.
However, the KKK was seen as more immoral and evoked more moral outrage than the
Republican Party and American Atheists.
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Experiment 2
Hate groups sometimes use subtle, persuasive messages to promote their
ideologies, so people may not always express moral outrage in response to hierarchyenhancing racist messages. Instead, people can become “contaminated” by hate groups,
which we suggest will cause people to actively seek opportunities to morally cleanse
themselves. We predict in Experiment 2 that seeking to morally cleanse oneself will lead
to greater vigilance for racism in one's environment than people who do not seek to
morally cleanse themselves. The moral credentials model (Monin & Miller, 2001)
predicts that people who express moral outrage will not perceive as much racism in their
environments than participants who did not express moral outrage. The sacred value
protection model (Tetlock et al., 2000) predicts that people who engage in overkill moral
defensive processes, so people who express moral outrage should perceive just as much
racism as participants who seek to morally cleanse themselves. We test these opposing
models in the present experiment.
Method
Participants. We recruited 150 undergraduate students to participate in partial
fulfillment of a course requirement. Participants were 71% female, 69% white, and 19
years old on average.
Procedure. Participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions that
manipulated whether the participants knew the source of some arguments against
affirmative action. The arguments are shown in Appendix B. In the before-argument
condition, participants read arguments against affirmative action and were told up front
that these arguments came from the Ku Klux Klan website. These arguments actually
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came from a blog posting on stormfront.org, a popular racist website. Participants were
then asked “Please write about the merits of the arguments, if any exist.” They then wrote
a free response to this prompt in which they could agree or disagree with the arguments,
although the wording of the instructions suggests that participants should write about the
ways in which they agree with the arguments. The default task for participants was to
agree with the arguments, so participants had to actively disagree with the arguments if
they wanted. In the after-argument condition, participants read the same arguments
against affirmative action, but they were not told the source of the arguments. They then
were asked “Please write about the merits of the arguments, if any exist.” After they
wrote about the merits of the arguments, they were told that those arguments were made
by the Ku Klux Klan. Thus, participants who agreed with the arguments were lead to
think that they shared the same beliefs as the KKK, which is morally contaminating for
those who value group-based equality. A third condition was an untreated control group,
where participants read the arguments and then were asked to “Please write about the
merits of arguments if any exist” without any mention of the KKK.
After this knowledge-of-source manipulation, all participants completed a
measure of positive and negative affect, and they then read parts of a mission statement
from the Council for Conservative Citizens, which is a covert hate group identified by the
Southern Poverty Law Center. This mission statement contains 14 parts that represent the
views and beliefs of the Council for Conservative Citizens. In the pilot study reported
above, each part was rated on how racist it was perceived to be from 1 (not at all racist)
to 7 (very racist). Two parts of the mission statement were selected for use in this
experiment because they were perceived to be moderately racist, represented by racist
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perception scores ranging around the midpoint of the scale (i.e., approximately 3.5). Part
two of the mission statement was selected because it specifically concerned the
organization‟s views of race in the U.S. All 14 parts of the mission statement are
displayed in Appendix C along with how racist, liberal, and conservative they were
perceived to be by the 67 pilot participants. The three parts selected for use in Experiment
2 are presented first. We suggest that these three parts could be seen as ambiguously
racist or not racist and still represent the organization‟s views on race in the U.S.
After reading these three parts to the mission statement, participants completed an
adapted version of the symbolic racism 2000 scale (Henry & Sears, 2002) to assess how
racist participants thought the organization was. Participants then completed measures of
social dominance orientation, political orientation, anti-black prejudice, and demographic
information and then debriefed and thanked for their time.
Measures.
Perceptions of Racism. We adapted a measure of symbolic racism from the scale
reported in Henry and Sears (2002). Six items were used to create our measure of how
racist participants thought the group was (α=.69). Appendix D displays the complete
scale, including all anchors. Instead of the items from the symbolic racism 2000 scale
referencing the how participants themselves would respond to the items, we adapted the
items to reference how the group whose mission statement they just read might respond
the items. For example, the original item on the symbolic racism 2000 scale was “Over
the past few years, blacks have gotten more economically than they deserve.” Our
parallel adapted item was “This organization believes that over the past few years, blacks
have gotten more than they deserve.”
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Positive and Negative Affect. Participants completed the 20 item positive and
negative affect schedule (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988). Participants rated how they
currently feel on 10 words denoting positive affect (α=.90; e.g., interested, strong,
enthusiastic) and on 10 words denoting negative affect (α=.85; e.g., upset, scared,
ashamed) on a scale from 1 (very slightly or not at all) to 5 (extremely).
Other Measures. Participants completed the same measures of social dominance
orientation (α=.91) and political orientation (α=.86) as they did in Experiment 1.
Additionally, participants completed the 20 item Attitudes Toward Blacks scale (α=.81;
Brigham, 1993). Some example items include “Black and white people are inherently
equal” and “Generally, blacks are not as smart as whites.” Participants rated these items
on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree).
Results
Coding of Agreement with the Argument. Participants were asked to “write
about the merits of the argument” against affirmative action in a free response format.
We decided to make agreement the default because the prompt for the free response lead
participants to agree with the arguments if they followed experimenter demand. If there
were no explicit disagreements with the arguments, participants were coded as agreeing
with the arguments, although this may have been due in part to experimenter demand and
the wording of the prompt. They were asked to “Please write about the merits of the
arguments, if any exist.” If participants indicated any form of disagreement with the
arguments, they were coded as disagreeing with the arguments, and this behavior can be
considered proactive given the wording of the prompt. Two coders, blind to
experimental condition, coded each participant‟s response as either agreeing (coded as a
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„0‟) or disagreeing (coded as a „1‟). The inter-rater agreement for this coding was good
(κ=.75). Disagreements were settled after discussion.
Positive and Negative Affect. We conducted a multivariate analysis of variance
with positive and negative affect as the two dependent variables (higher scores indicate
greater experience of affect) and with condition (i.e., before-argument, after-argument,
control) and agreement (i.e., agree or disagree with the arguments) as the independent
variables. We found a marginally significant main effect of agreement with the argument
on positive and negative affect (F (2, 143) = 2.64, p < .10). The condition effect and the
interaction between condition and agreement were not significant (Fs<1). Participants
experienced the same levels of positive and negative affect in the outrage (Mp=2.84;
Mn=1.47), contamination (Mp=2.64; Mn=1.53), and control (Mp=2.59; Mn=1.53).
Univariate tests reveal that participants who disagreed with the argument experienced
greater negative affect (M=1.61) than participants who agreed with the argument
(M=1.29), t (148) = 2.28, p<.05, d=.37. Despite this significant mean difference, the
mean levels of negative affect were at the bottom of the scale, so participants did not
experience very much negative affect.
Perceptions of Racism. We conducted a two-way analysis of variance with
knowledge-of-source condition (i.e., before-argument, after-argument, control) and
agreement (i.e., agree or disagree with the arguments) as the independent variables and
our adapted symbolic racism measure as the dependent variable. We did not find
significant main effects for condition (F (2, 144) < 1) or the agreement factors (F (1, 144)
<1). We did, however, find a marginally significant interaction effect of agreement and
condition on perceptions of symbolic racism, F (2, 144) = 2.83, p=.06. Because symbolic
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racism has bases in political conservatism and old-fashioned racism (Henry & Sears,
2002) and because hate groups are perceived to violate the racial equality sacred value by
being racist (Experiment 1), we statistically controlled for the effects of political
orientation, attitudes toward blacks, and social dominance orientation. When controlling
for all three of these covariates, we found a significant interaction effect of agreement
and condition on perceptions of symbolic racism, F (2, 141) = 3.07, p<.05. Table 3
displays the adjusted means for perceptions of symbolic racism. Our treatment
comparisons are conducted using this model controlling for political orientation, attitudes
toward blacks, and social dominance orientation.
We were interested in four treatment comparisons. Figure 3 displays a box plot of
the results (see Lane & Sandor, 2009). We were interested in whether becoming
contaminated by the KKK would make people perceive more racism in their
environments, which occurred in the after-argument condition when participants agreed
with the arguments made. We will compare this condition to the cases where (1)
participants were not contaminated by the KKK (i.e., in the after-argument condition
when they disagreed with the arguments), (2) participants knew the arguments came from
the KKK (before-argument condition) and disagreed with them, (3) participants knew the
arguments came from the KKK (before-argument condition) and agreed with them, and
(4) participants agreed with the arguments but the KKK was never mentioned (i.e.,
control condition).
(1) Participants who were morally contaminated by the KKK perceived more
racism in the mission statement (M=4.30) than participants who were not morally
contaminated by the KKK (M=3.88), F (1, 144) = 3.83, p=.05, d=.55. (2) Participants
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who were morally contaminated by the KKK did not perceive more racism in the mission
statement (M=4.30) than participants who knew the arguments came from the KKK and
disagreed with them (M=4.2), F (1, 141) <1, d=.14. (3) Participants who were morally
contaminated by the KKK perceived more racism in the mission statement (M=4.30) than
participants who knew the arguments came from the KKK and agreed with the arguments
(M=3.85), F (1, 141) = 4.73, p<.05, d=.59. (4) Participants who were morally
contaminated by KKK did not perceive more racism in the mission statement (M=4.30)
than participants who agreed with the arguments but were never told about the KKK
(M=4.01), F (1, 141) = 1.91, p>.10, d=.37.
Discussion
We hypothesized the participants who were motivated to morally cleanse
themselves would perceive more racism in their environment than participants who were
not motivated to morally cleanse themselves. Participants who were morally
contaminated by the Ku Klux Klan perceived more racism than participants who
disagreed with the arguments against affirmative action and were subsequently told that
the arguments came from the KKK. We also found support for the sacred value
protection model‟s (Tetlock et al., 2000) prediction that people would engage in moral
overkill and perceive more racism after engaging in moral outrage. We also found
support for the compensatory hypothesis. When participants first disagreed with the
arguments and were then told that the arguments came from the KKK, they perceived
less racism than participants who agreed with the arguments and were then told that they
came from the KKK. Thus, in the conditions where participants disagreed with the
arguments—both before and after the source of those arguments was known, we found
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support for both the overkill and compensatory hypotheses. When participants knew that
arguments came from the KKK at the outset, they engaged in overkill moral reactions
and increased their vigilance against racism. Disagreeing with the arguments first without
knowing the source may have established participants as nonprejudiced, and they may
have been unaffected—and perhaps relieved—when they found out that the arguments
came from the KKK. Because the KKK represents an extreme violation of racial
equality, people may be especially motivated to rid themselves of racism and thus be
more vigilant about perceiving racism.
General Discussion
The purpose of the present research was to investigate whether people perceive
hate groups as immoral social agents who evoke moral outrage and how people may react
to the morally contaminating influence of hate groups in the U.S. We found support for
the hypothesis that hate groups are perceived to be immoral social agents and that they
evoke moral outrage among those who value group-based equality. Many hate groups,
such as the Ku Klux Klan, violate a racial egalitarian ideology, which causes people who
desire equal group relations to express moral outrage. Despite their overtly racist and
prejudiced missions, hate groups are adapting their propaganda to conform to social
norms of racial equality by focusing on ingroup favoritism (e.g., white power) instead of
outgroup derogation (e.g., overtly blaming black people for problems in society).
We were interested in the ways that exposure to hate groups may increase
people‟s perceptions of racism in ambiguously racist discourse. We found that
participants who were lead to believe that they share compatible beliefs about affirmative
action with the Ku Klux Klan perceived more racism in an ambiguously racist mission
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statement than participants who were not lead to believe that they share compatible
beliefs about affirmative action with the KKK. Participants who expressed moral outrage
by disagreeing with the KKK perceived the same level of racism in the mission statement
than participants who were motivated to morally cleanse themselves. This latter finding
supports the overkill hypothesis proposed by the sacred value protection model (Tetlock
et al., 2000) and does not support the prediction made by the moral credentials model
(Monin & Miller, 2001). However, participants who disagreed with the arguments and
were then told that they came from the KKK—thereby establishing themselves as
nonracist—perceived less racism than participants who were morally contaminated by the
KKK, which supports the compensatory hypothesis and moral credentials model. The
present study, in all, explored people‟s perceptions of and reactions to hate groups in the
United States.
Overkill or Compensation
The Ku Klux Klan and other hate groups represent an extremist group in the
discourse surrounding race relations in the U.S. Because of this, they are very likely to
evoke strong moral reactions among those who value racial equality. When people are
confronted with such an extreme moral transgressor, they engage in moral protection
processes that may be redundant and appear irrational (i.e., overkill hypothesis; Tetlock
et al., 2000). When moral reactions to sacred value violators (e.g., moral outrage and
moral cleansing) are relatively easy to do and when the violator is especially intolerable,
people seek many opportunities to engage in moral outrage and to morally cleanse, which
may include both expressing moral outrage and seeking out ways to morally cleanse
oneself. We found evidence of the overkill hypothesis in Experiment 2. Tetlock et al.
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(2000) predict that when outrage or cleansing are not easy to do or when the violation is
not as serious, people may engage in compensatory actions (e.g., merely expressing
moral outrage) that require no further cognitive, affective, or behavioral moral work.
This compensatory hypothesis is the one advocated by Monin and Miller‟s (2001)
moral credentials model. When people establish themselves as moral by fighting against
prejudice, they no longer need to “prove” themselves to be non-prejudiced. We found
support for this model as well. Typically, this model is tested with a less extreme instance
of prejudice than hate groups (e.g., discriminatory hiring between a black or white
applicant) where establishing moral credentials can relieve people of the problem of
doing something about prejudice. When participants did not know the source and
disagreed with the arguments, they may have established themselves as nonracist. Once
these participants knew the source of the arguments, it further established them as
nonracist because they did not see themselves as similar to the KKK. They then
perceived less racism in the mission statement because they had already earned their
moral license as nonracist people.
Because hate groups threaten sacred values and can morally contaminate people
within a moral community, they evoke strong moral reactions and defensive strategies
that do not let people escape as easily from moral transgressions against racial
egalitarianism. We suggest that contaminating people with the reality of hate groups—an
extreme moral transgressor—in the U.S. may motivate extended action and vigilance
against racism in one‟s environment, which can motivate people to behave in egalitarian
ways. Dismissing the influence of overt agents of prejudice can make people less aware
of the variety of expressions of prejudice, which can contribute to the idea that prejudice
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and discrimination are no longer problems. Revealing the source of hierarchy-enhancing
political discourse can motivate people to label that discourse for what it is (e.g., racist,
sexist, and so on).
After Perceiving Racism
One of the major deterrents to engaging in prosocial bystander behavior is not
noticing that something is happening and not interpreting it as a problem (AshburnNardo, Morris, Goodwin, 2008; Latane & Darley, 1970). The present experiments
suggest that hate groups can be used to get people to realize that racism exists and that it
is a problem. The next steps include ensuring that people are responsible for acting
against racism and providing people with behavioral skills to actually engage in
hierarchy-attenuating behavior. A 2009 Gallup poll showed that 49% of white Americans
believe racism against blacks is widespread while 78% of blacks believe racism is
widespread (Newport, 2009). Thus, approximately half of white Americans do not
believe that racism is a problem, so they may not believe that they could do something to
solve a problem that they do not believe even exists.
Making people aware of racism in their environments may provide a contrast to
their belief in racial equality. When people believe they have engaged in racist ways, they
may be motivated to change the way they respond to be more consistent with their
egalitarian beliefs (Monteith & Mark, 2005). Getting people to believe that racism exists
is the first hurdle that exposure to hate groups and potentially other blatant forms of
racism help to eliminate. By exposing people to their own ideological inconsistencies
(e.g., racism and egalitarianism), we can induce cognitive dissonance that may motivate a
change in people‟s prejudiced ways (Monteith & Mark, 2005). Using hate groups or other
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extreme instances of racism and prejudice can help to ensure that people cannot just
affirm another unrelated aspect of their self (Steele, 1988) but instead must confront
racism itself (Tetlock et al., 2000).
Merely educating people about the problems of racism, however, is not enough to
motivate vigilance against racism. As we show in Experiment 2, vigilance against racism
occurs once people become morally contaminated by hate groups (i.e., there is increased
overlap between people‟s belief systems and hate groups‟ belief systems). When people
distance themselves from racial inequality by rejecting anti-affirmative action arguments
first and are then told that the arguments come from a hate group, they become less
vigilant to racism than when people do not reject those arguments and are then told that
they come from a hate group. This finding suggests that in order to motivate vigilance
against racism, people must feel morally contaminated by the problem. They must feel as
though they are part of the problem and must therefore confront it. It appears as though
when people realize that they are an actor and contributor of a larger systemic problem of
hierarchy and oppression, they can be motivated to be vigilant to the problem and
perhaps act more in line with egalitarianism and other hierarchy-attenuating ideologies.
Future research can extend the model we explored in the present thesis by understanding
the hierarchy-attenuating behavioral implications of being vigilant to racism in one‟s
environment (e.g., confronting racist remarks; Ashburn-Nardo, Morris, & Goodwin,
2008).
Spatial Moral Contamination
We predict that people can be morally contaminated in spatial terms in addition to
the psychological contamination participants experienced in Experiment 2. By telling
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people that hate groups operate in their own communities or that they will come to visit
the places that people live their lives (e.g., homes, restaurants, malls, and so on), people
may feel morally contaminated, which can induce moral cleansing and moral outrage
processes. In order to cleanse a proximal moral contaminant, people may have to
physically remove the contaminant. With regard to hate groups living in a community,
people may be ideologically required to engage in social activism and work to physically
remove hate groups from one‟s community. Research on collective action (see van
Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008) can inform how people may engage in collective
action to successfully protest against the morally contaminating presence of hate groups
in people‟s communities. Hate groups can provide a strong ideological contrast that
motivates people to change their physical ecology in order to follow more directly from
their egalitarian ideals. Future research can investigate this hypothesis to see if hate
groups can be used to propagate anti-racist and egalitarian group relations.
Conclusion
Even though contemporary research on prejudice suggests that it may be hidden
(Henry & Sears, 2002), subtle (Meertens & Pettigrew, 1997), or implicit (Greenwald,
McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998), overt forms of prejudice still operate in contemporary
society. Focusing on the covert forms of prejudice may distract psychological research
from examining the influence of overt forms of prejudice that may still have influence in
society. Hate groups, for example, can morally contaminate people when they are aware
that they exist, and they can subsequently motivate people to perceive racism in their
environments—one of the greatest hurdles to prosocial behavior. The present research
explores the contaminating influence of hate groups in the U.S. and seeks to explore how
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they can be used to provide an ideological contrast to people‟s egalitarian beliefs and
motivate vigilance against racism.
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Table 1
List of Groups Rated in Pilot Study on Ratings of How Familiar, Liberal, Conservative, and Racist the Groups were Perceived to Be
Group Name

Type of Group

Accuracy in
Media

Conservative

Alliance
Defense Fund

Conservative

American
Conservative
Union

Conservative

American
Values Agenda

Conservative

Christian
Coalition of
America

Conservative

Citizens for the
Republic

Conservative

Familiarity
Ratings
2.36 (1.87)

Liberal Ratings

Racism Ratings

4.66 (1.`67)

Conservative
Ratings
3.57 (1.73)

N=66

N=58

N=58

N=59

1.40 (.97)

3.56 (1.48)

4.19 (1.42)

2.39 (1.55)

N=67

N=54

N=54

N=54

1.62 (1.27)

1.91 (1.44)

6.09 (1.42)

2.75 (1.46)

N=65

N=58

N=58

N=57

1.38 (1.04)

3.36 (1.58)

4.04 (1.64)

2.62 (1.63)

N=67

N=53

N=52

N=52

2.12 (1.59)

2.72 (1.59)

5.39 (1.46)

2.76 (1.73)

N=66

N=57

N=59

N=58

1.79 (1.49)

3.16 (1.40)

4.29 (1.59)

2.70 (1.59)

N=67

N=55

N=56

N=56

2.44 (1.67)

Identified
Correctly
No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Group Name

Type of Group

Council for the
Defense of
Freedom

Conservative

Democracy
Alliance

Conservative

Faith and
Family Alliance

Focus on the
Family

Conservative

Conservative

Institute for
Foreign Policy
Analysis

Conservative

National Rifle
Association

Conservative

Republican
Party

Conservative

Familiarity
Ratings
1.79 (1.46)

Liberal Ratings

Racism Ratings

4.05 (1.68)

Conservative
Ratings
3.95 (1.73)

N=67

N=57

N=57

N=57

1.94 (1.45)

4.67 (1.72)

3.13 (1.63)

2.04 (1.32)

N=66

N=55

N=55

N=55

1.66 (1.23)

2.98 (1.59)

4.67 (1.75)

2.39 (1.37)

N=65

N=57

N=57

N=57

1.83 (1.49)

3.60 (1.65)

4.45 (1.64)

2.02 (1.38)

N=66

N=55

N=55

N=55

1.48 (.93)

3.67 (1.69)

3.57 (1.62)

2.39 (1.50)

N=66

N=54

N=54

N=54

3.74 (2.13)

2.90 (1.91)

5.20 (1.79)

2.37 (1.60)

N=66

N=60

N=59

N=60

5.37 (1.82)

2.18 (1.45)

6.02 (1.40)

3.22 (1.69)

N=67

N=65

N=66

N=65

2.39 (1.58)

Identified
Correctly
No

No

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Group Name
Rightroots

Type of Group
Conservative

Young
Americans for
Freedom

Conservative

20/20 Vision

Liberal

Alliance for
Democracy

Democratic
Party

Liberal

Liberal

Democratic
Socialists of
America

Liberal

Emily‟s List

Liberal

Familiarity
Ratings
1.15 (.71)

Liberal Ratings

Racism Ratings

3.73 (1.48)

Conservative
Ratings
3.65 (1.49)

N=66

N=49

N=49

N=49

1.75 (1.42)

5.26 (1.63)

2.92 (1.45)

2.19 (1.65)

N=67

N=53

N=53

N=53

1.53 (1.34)

3.60 (1.77)

3.06 (1.56)

2.37 (1.73)

N=66

N=52

N=52

N=52

2.17 (1.58)

4.80 (1.84)

3.03 (1.68)

1.92 (1.38)

N=65

N=60

N=60

N=60

5.36 (1.65)

6.02 (1.12)

2.14 (1.16)

1.80 (1.35)

N=66

N=65

N=65

N=65

2.24 (1.46)

5.14 (1.75)

2.66 (1.76)

2.17 (1.43)

N=67

N=58

N=58

N=58

1.09 (.62)

3.63 (1.62)

2.98 (1.38)

2.34 (1.51)

N=67

N=49

N=49

N=49

2.79 (1.62)

Identified
Correctly
No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Group Name

Type of Group

Institute for
America‟s
Future

Liberal

League of
Women Voters

Liberal

MoveOn

New
Beginnings

Planned
Parenthood

Pride
Foundation

Progressive
Majority

Liberal

Liberal

Liberal

Liberal

Liberal

Familiarity
Ratings
1.44 (.99)

Liberal Ratings

Racism Ratings

4.43 (1.62)

Conservative
Ratings
3.49 (1.58)

N=66

N=53

N=53

N=53

2.41 (1.71)

5.46 (1.76)

2.67 (1.79)

1.89 (1.47)

N=66

N=61

N=60

N=61

1.24 (.78)

4.06 (1.67)

3.21 (1.51)

2.85 (1.81)

N=52

N=52

N=52

1.39 (1.01)

4.02 (1.67)

3.26 (1.45)

2.27 (1.51)

N=66

N=51

N=50

N=51

4.67 (1.96)

5.34 (1.84)

2.70 (1.76)

1.32 (.82)

N=66

N=64

N=64

N=63

1.56 (1.23)

4.47 (1.77)

3.29 (1.62)

2.36 (1.44)

N=66

N=55

N=55

N=55

1.51 (1.25)

4.45 (1.59)

3.11 (1.27)

2.98 (1.92)

N=67

N=53

N=53

N=53

2.21 (1.42)

Identified
Correctly
Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Group Name

Type of Group

Public Citizen

Liberal

True Majority

Working for
Change

Aryan Nations

Black Metal

Christian
Identity

Council of
Conservative
Citizens

Liberal

Liberal

Hate

Hate

Hate

Hate

Familiarity
Ratings
2.00 (1.81)

Liberal Ratings

Racism Ratings

3.85 (1.41)

Conservative
Ratings
3.53 (1.32)

N=66)

N=53

N=53

N=53

1.51 (1.25)

3.96 (1.64)

3.52 (1.61)

2.83 (1.78)

N=67

N=52

N=52

N=52

1.72 (1.42)

4.80 (1.72)

3.07 (1.61)

2.13 (1.54)

N=67

N=54

N=54

N=54

2.77 (2.08)

2.63 (1.70)

5.00 (1.79)

5.22 (2.04)

N=64

N=56

N=56

N=58

1.28 (1.07)

3.51 (1.56)

3.37 (1.65)

3.18 (1.85)

N=67

N=49

N=49

N=50

2.51 (2.02)

2.80 (1.79)

5.37 (1.64)

2.89 (1.72)

N=67

N=56

N=57

N=57

1.83 (1.30)

1.62 (.99)

6.35 (1.11)

3.04 (1.73)

N=67

N=55

N=55

N=54

2.74 (1.42)

Identified
Correctly
Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

Group Name
Creativity
Movement

Hammerskins

Ku Klux Klan

National
Alliance

Type of Group
Hate

Hate

Hate

Hate

National
Socialist
Movement

Hate

Nationalist
Coalition

Hate

Skinheads

Hate

Familiarity
Ratings
1.63 (1.29)

Liberal Ratings

Racism Ratings

4.80 (1.62)

Conservative
Ratings
2.87 (1.45)

N=67

N=54

N=54

N=54

1.14 (.58)

3.33 (1.60)

3.83 (1.64)

3.82 (1.93)

N=65

N=48

N=48

N=49

5.97 (1.40)

2.25 (2.12)

5.19 (2.44)

6.55 (1.55)

N=66

N=65

N=64

N=66

1.79 (1.41)

3.82 (1.42)

4.00 (1.47)

2.38 (1.46)

N=67

N=55

N=54

N=53

2.27 (1.77)

4.76 (1.90)

3.05 (1.86)

2.70 (1.82)

N=67

N=59

N=59

N=60

1.46 (1.11)

3.56 (1.27)

3.62 (1.39)

2.75 (1.63)

N=67

N=52

N=52

N=52

3.80 (1.94)

2.55 (1.92)

4.87 (2.12)

6.28 (1.53)

N=66

N=62

N=62

N=64

1.98 (1.39)

Identified
Correctly
No

No

Yes

No

No

No

Yes

Group Name
Volksfront

Type of Group
Hate

White Aryan
Resistance
(WAR)

Hate

White Order of
Thule

Hate

White
Revolution

Hate

Familiarity
Ratings
1.12 (.77)

Liberal Ratings

Racism Ratings

3.44 (1.43)

Conservative
Ratings
3.46 (1.41)

N=67

N=48

N=48

N=48

2.40 (2.04)

2.53 (1.72)

4.66 (1.97)

5.40 (2.04)

N=67

N=58

N=58

N=60

1.05 (.21)

2.92 (1.46)

3.96 (1.68)

4.30 (2.14)

N=66

N=49

N=49

N=50

1.85 (1.31)

2.82 (1.95)

5.00 (1.95)

5.89 (1.53)

N=67

N=52

N=55

N=56

Note. Means are presented first with standard deviations in parentheses.

2.88 (1.55)

Identified
Correctly
No

Yes

Yes

Yes
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Table 2
Correlation matrices for Experiment 1 variables overall and by condition
Overall (N=85)

1.

1. SDO

--

2.

3.

2. Political Orientation

-.38***

--

3. Perceptions of Immorality

.29***

-.20+

--

4. Moral Outrage

.48***

-.32***

.78***

4.

--

KKK Condition (N=29)
1. SDO

--

2. Political Orientation

-.33+

--

3. Perceptions of Immorality

.25ns

-.08ns

--

4. Moral Outrage

.53**

-.12ns

.81***

--

Republican Party Condition (N=28)
1. SDO

--

2. Political Orientation

-.36+

--

3. Perceptions of Immorality

.27ns

-.28ns

--

4. Moral Outrage

.47*

-.53**

.57**

--

American Atheists Condition (N=28)
1. SDO

--

2. Political Orientation

-.43*

--

3. Perceptions of Immorality

.28ns

-.23ns

--

4. Moral Outrage

.46*

-.34+

.83***

Note. ***p<.001. **p<.01. *p<.05. +p<.10. nsp>.10.

--
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Table 3
Mean perceptions of racism in the mission statement of the Council for Conservative
Citizens by condition (i.e., before-argument, after-argument, and control) and agreement
with the arguments against affirmative action.
BeforeArgument
3.86a

AfterArgument
4.31b

Control

Totals (N)

4.00ab

81

Disagree

4.18b

3.89a

4.06ab

69

Totals (N)

47

51

52

150

Agree

Note. Means with different letters are significantly different each other (p<.05).
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Figure 1
Ratings of immorality, controlling for support for group based equality by the source of
the argument against immigration

Note. Range is 1 (moral) to 7 (immoral).

MORALLY CONTAMINATING HATE GROUPS
Figure 2
Moral outrage, controlling for support for group based equality by the source of the
argument against immigration

Note. Range is 1 (low moral outrage) to 7.33 (high moral outrage).
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Figure 3
Perceptions of racism in the mission statement by condition (outrage, contamination, and
control) and agreement with the argument
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Appendix A
Arguments against immigration to the U.S. used in Experiment 1
It‟s about time the U.S. cracked down on illegal immigration. With our country in
economic turmoil and the continued threat of terrorism, we can‟t afford to take any risks
with the homeland. Illegals probably brought the Swine Flu to the U.S., which has
already killed thousands of people and costs millions of dollars in productivity. With our
unemployment rate at 10%, we need to preserve jobs for Americans. Immigrants are
costing our country money we can‟t afford right now, with their dependency on welfare,
wanting free educations and medical care, and high costs of bilingual education.
Immigrants often come from backward countries that don‟t understand our traditions of
religion and freedom, and there is a real danger of watering down our culture because of
too much immigration. It would be nice if the U.S. could be all things to all people, but
right now, its time to keep America for the Americans.

MORALLY CONTAMINATING HATE GROUPS
Appendix B
Arguments against affirmative action used in Experiment 2
The federal government has enacted programs and laws designed for the
exclusive discrimination against those of White European ancestry. Promotions, hiring
and scholarships should be based on ability and not upon a person's race. Affirmative
action is a growing source of economical inequality for Caucasians especially
considering that in the current United States economic recession such a policy
disenfranchises a growing number of unemployed Caucasians who have to wait last in
line for any sense of being employed because of non-Caucasians who get jobs before
them.
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Appendix C
Means and standard deviations from ratings of the parts of the mission statement from the Council for Conservative Citizens. Parts 2,
6, and 12 of the Mission Statement were selected to be used in Experiment 2.
Text from Mission Statement
2. We believe the United States is a European country and that Americans are part of the
European people. We believe that the United States derives from and is an integral part of
European civilization and the European people and that the American people and government
should remain European in their composition and character. We therefore oppose the massive
immigration of non-European and non-Western peoples into the United States that threatens to
transform our nation into a non-European majority in our lifetime. We believe that illegal
immigration must be stopped, if necessary by military force and placing troops on our national
borders; that illegal aliens must be returned to their own countries; and that legal immigration
must be severely restricted or halted through appropriate changes in our laws and policies. We
also oppose all efforts to mix the races of mankind, to promote non-white races over the
European-American people through so-called “affirmative action” and similar measures, to
destroy or denigrate the European-American heritage, including the heritage of the Southern
people, and to force the integration of the races.
6. The traditional family is the basic unit of human society. We believe in the traditional
family as the basic unit of human society and morality, and we oppose all efforts by the state and
other powers to weaken the structure of the American family through toleration of sexual
licentiousness, homosexuality and other perversions, mixture of the races, pornography in all
forms, and subversion of the authority of parents.

Liberal
Ratings
2.63
(1.78)
N=67

Conservative
Ratings
4.96 (1.93)
N=67

Racist
Ratings
5.10
(1.99)
N=67

2.52
(1.84)
N=67

5.40 (1.93)
N=67

3.85
(2.21)
N=66

Text from Mission Statement
12. Traditional Education under Local Control. We believe that education is primarily the
concern of parents and families and local communities and therefore we oppose federal aid to
education and federal efforts to control or direct education. We believe that education should
inform and build the mind and character, not brainwash children with political propaganda or
“liberate” them from the traditional values and loyalties their families have taught them. We
therefore oppose all “sex education” as well as so-called “multiculturalist” and “Afrocentric”
curricula, “Outcome-Based Education,” and similar radical indoctrination in the schools. We
oppose all efforts to inflate grades, adulterate or “dumb down” tests and examinations, and
introduce irrelevant and wasteful courses for the purpose of advancing some backward students
over others more talented or more productive. We believe the schools, public, private, and
parochial, should teach students to be proud of being Americans and proud of their national and
local identities, and that they should instill in them the values of Western, Christian, and
American civilization. We support the authority of teachers and school administrators to
discipline students, including the authority to expel them from school if students will not abide
by the rules and laws of the community. We support the right of parents to send their children to
private schools or to educate their children at home if they so desire, without government
intrusion or control. We support the right of private schools to select their own students, faculty,
curricula, standards, and methods of administration.
1. We believe the United States is a Christian country. We believe that the United States of
America is a Christian country, that its people are a Christian people, and that its government
and public leaders at all levels must reflect Christian beliefs and values. We therefore oppose all
efforts to deny or weaken the Christian heritage of the United States, including the
unconstitutional prohibitions of prayers and other religious expression in schools and other
public institutions.

Liberal
Ratings
2.67
(1.94)
N=67

Conservative
Ratings
5.57 (1.66)
N=67

Racist
Ratings
3.03
(1.95)
N=66

2.30
(1.78)
N=67

5.49 (1.88)
N=67

3.15
(2.18)
N=67

Text from Mission Statement
3. The United States is a sovereign and independent nation. We believe the United States is a
sovereign and independent nation, that our independence as a nation is the most precious legacy
of our Founding Fathers, and that all treaties, agreements, conventions, international
organizations, and institutions must recognize and respect our national sovereignty and
independence. We therefore oppose the so-called “New World Order” and its attempts to abolish
national sovereignty and independence and to construct a one-world state in which America
would vanish and Americans would be enslaved. We call for the U.S. government to withdraw
from membership in the United Nations, the World Court, the International Monetary Fund,
NAFTA, and the World Trade Organization. We oppose any attempt to place American military
personnel under foreign command. We oppose any effort to place Americans, military or
civilian, on trial before, or subject them to legal punishments by, international courts or
organizations. We oppose, and we support official U.S. renunciation of, any treaty, agreement,
or convention that seeks to dictate law to the United States or any state, that violates national
sovereignty, or denies or violates the constitutional rights of Americans.

Liberal
Ratings
4.03
(1.90)
N=67

Conservative
Ratings
4.32 (1.88)
N=66

Racist
Ratings
2.38
(1.65)
N=66

Text from Mission Statement
4. The United States is a constitutional republic. We believe the United States is a
constitutional republic, governed by law and by the original intent of the United States
Constitution and of the men who framed it. We believe the Constitution can be changed only by
the proper procedure of amendment or constitutional convention and not by court decision,
popular majority, political whim, or legislative fiat. We therefore oppose the “imperial judiciary”
in the U.S. Supreme Court and the federal courts that has usurped more and more power to itself
in the last century and has imposed on our country the most odious and harmful rulings. We
reject the legitimacy and constitutionality of the rulings handed down by the imperial judiciary;
we support the appointment of judges and justices who are qualified to interpret the Constitution
and the laws and are committed to their proper interpretation; and we support the impeachment
of judges and justices who usurp or claim powers not granted them by the Constitution. We also
oppose the “imperial bureaucracy” that imposes unconstitutional administrative decrees in such
fields as business, agriculture, labor, and education that tyrannically interfere with personal
liberty and dignity, private property, the sanctity of the family, and ethical conduct. We support
the abolition of those government agencies at the federal, state, and local levels that have no
constitutional foundation, including the U.S. Departments of Education, Housing and Urban
Development, Energy, Health and Human Services, and similar agencies. We support the
separation of powers that is a fundamental principle of the U.S. Constitution and of basic human
liberty. We support the restoration of the constitutionally proper balance among the three
branches of the federal government and the reduction of their powers, size, personnel, and costs
to the limits intended by the Constitution.

Liberal
Ratings
3.52
(1.78)
N=67

Conservative
Ratings
5.24 (1.44)
N=67

Racist
Ratings
1.95
(1.33)
N=66

Text from Mission Statement
5. We believe in States’ Rights, the Right to Keep and Bear Arms, and the Bill of Rights.
We believe in states‟ rights, as guaranteed by the Ninth and Tenth Amendments to the
Constitution; in the individual right to keep and bear arms, as guaranteed by the Second
Amendment to the Constitution; and in all the rights and liberties guaranteed by the body of the
Constitution and the Bill of Rights. We therefore oppose all efforts by the federal government to
dictate to the states and local governments and communities, and we oppose federal efforts to
engineer or impose behavior and beliefs on citizens and communities. We oppose “gun control”
in all forms and demand that all such legislation and policies be repealed. We also oppose all
such legislation as so-called “hate crime” or “bias crime” laws. Such laws merely penalize
thought and expression rather than genuinely criminal action and are a dangerous and frightening
step toward government Thought Control. Similarly, we oppose all so-called “politically correct”
speech codes and “sensitivity training” in schools, colleges, universities, and businesses that
punish free expression, restrict thought and study, intimidate dissent, and generally demean and
diminish human communications and community. We also oppose, as stated, all efforts to deny
Americans their rights of religious expression and worship as guaranteed in the First
Amendment, as well as efforts to deny rights of assembly and association.

Liberal
Ratings
3.52
(2.03)
N=65

Conservative
Ratings
5.13 (1.68)
N=67

Racist
Ratings
2.05
(1.55)
N=66

Text from Mission Statement
7. Private property and free enterprise are the foundations of our economy. We believe in
private property and free enterprise as the foundations of our economic life and the basis of
American wealth. We oppose efforts by the state to regulate, plan, manage, control, or
nationalize private property in any form. We oppose the ruinous taxation that government has
imposed on working Americans and we call for real tax reform that will allow working men and
women to retain what they have earned. We support the repeal of the estate tax. We affirm that
the best economic decision-maker is the individual acting in what he believes is his own best
interest. We believe that tax policies and other economic legislation and policies should reflect the
importance of small businessmen, the family farm, and other independent, locally and privately
owned and operated enterprises. While we accept the need for some public welfare, health care,
unemployment, and old age assistance, we believe in such programs only as a last resort for
those who truly need them. We believe tax laws should encourage private charity rather than
public support for the poor, the disabled, and the sick and elderly who are unable to care for
themselves. We support welfare programs that seek to return recipients of welfare to productive
work as soon as possible. We oppose all welfare for immigrants, whether legal or illegal.
8. Cultural, national, and racial integrity. We support the cultural and national heritage of the
United States and the race and civilization of which it is a part, as well as the expression and
celebration of the legitimate subcultures and ethnic and regional identities of our people. We
oppose all efforts to discredit, “debunk,” denigrate, ridicule, subvert, or express disrespect for
that heritage. We believe public monuments and symbols should reflect the real heritage of our
people, and not a politically convenient, inaccurate, insulting, or fictitious heritage.
9. A Strong National Defense. We believe in the strongest possible defense for the United
States. We oppose the presence of homosexuals and women in the military services and
especially of women in combat roles.

Liberal
Ratings
3.48
(2.00)
N=67

Conservative
Ratings
4.93 (1.90)
N=67

Racist
Ratings
2.88
(1.81)
N=67

4.43
(1.92)
N=67

3.82 (1.84)
N=67

1.90
(1.40)
N=67

2.18
(1.81)
N=66

6.23 (1.41)
N=66

3.22
(2.30)
N=65

Text from Mission Statement

Liberal
Ratings
4.22
(1.80)
N=67

10. America First Foreign Policy. We believe that in the aftermath of the U.S. victory over
Soviet Communism, the United States has little need to retain the political and military
commitments to allies made during the Cold War. While we wish these allies well, we believe
we cannot continue to support their defense budgets, guarantee their security, fight their wars, or
finance their governments and economies through foreign aid. We therefore call for a
comprehensive review of all U.S. diplomatic commitments and U.S. withdrawal from those
alliances and commitments that no longer serve our national interests or that threaten to entangle
us in unnecessary foreign wars, conflicts, and quarrels. We therefore oppose continued
membership in NATO and similar outdated Cold War alliances; we oppose sending American
troops on U.N. peace-keeping missions or into similar unconstitutionally undeclared wars under
the names of “police actions.” We oppose sending American military personnel into wars and
conflicts that do not concern our national security and interests. We oppose ever sending
American military men into combat without the intention to achieve victory. We oppose using
American prisoners of war as diplomatic “bargaining chips” under any circumstances, and we
oppose abandoning American POWs to merciless enemies after the cessation of conflict to suit
the political interests of office-holders. We oppose all foreign aid and call for its termination. We
support the investigation of lobbying groups that represent the interests of foreign states or
foreign powers and the enactment of legislation that will outlaw lobbying Congress or the
executive branch on behalf of foreign states.
11. America First Trade Policy. We believe that just as our nation has legitimate international
4.06
political and military interests, so it also has a legitimate international economic interest. We
(1.80)
believe our trade policy should reflect our national economic interest and that the protection of
N=66
our economy, including the jobs of our workers, our farms, and our manufacturing industries, is
a vitally necessary duty of our national government.

Conservative
Ratings
4.07 (1.90)
N=67

Racist
Ratings
2.53
(1.70)
N=66

4.07 (1.90)
N=66

2.53
(1.70)
N=66

Text from Mission Statement
13. Strong and Just Law Enforcement. We believe in the moral and legal responsibility of the
individual and therefore that good behavior should be rewarded and bad behavior should be
punished. We believe the most effective and most just response to crime is swift, certain, and
morally appropriate punishment. We believe in capital punishment for the crimes of murder,
rape, treason, and espionage. We oppose the substitution of the pseudo-sciences of psychiatry,
sociology, and “rehabilitation” for real justice. We believe law enforcement should be mainly a
function of local and state government, and we therefore oppose all efforts to establish a national
police force or to nationalize law enforcement; we oppose similar efforts to create a global or
international police force and to “globalize” law enforcement. We oppose the extradition of lawabiding American citizens to trials before foreign courts under laws to which they have never
assented. We oppose all international criminal tribunals and all efforts to diminish national
sovereignty through the internationalization of criminal law. While we support and deeply
respect all law enforcement officers, we also insist that law enforcement at all levels operate
within the law, that law enforcement respect the rights of all citizens, and that spying on and
harassment of loyal and law-abiding citizens by law enforcement agencies, by the military
services, or by intelligence services at any level of government should be strictly forbidden and
severely punished.
14. Protection of the Environment and Natural Heritage. We believe that the natural
environment and resources of a nation are among its most precious, valuable, and irreplaceable
treasures. We believe in the protection of the environment from reckless greed as well as from
irresponsible government. We support the protection of truly endangered species of wildlife and
areas of natural beauty.
Note. Means are presented first with standard deviations in parentheses.
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Ratings
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Ratings
5.13 (1.77)
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(1.49)
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3.52 (1.84)
N=67
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(1.16)
N=67
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Appendix C
Adapted items from the symbolic racism 2000 scale (Henry & Sears, 2002) to measure
how racist participants thought the organization was.
Instructions. What is you impression of this organization? How does this organization
think? Please fill out the questions below as a member of the organization—NOT YOUR
OWN VIEWS. Now, we would like to know your opinions of the group whose mission
statement you just read.
Some say that black leaders have been trying to push too fast. Others feel that they
haven‟t pushed fast enough. What does this organization think about this? (Reverse
Coded)
Trying to push very much too fast

Moving at about the right
speed

Going too
Slowly

How much of the racial tension that exists in the United States today does this
organization think blacks are responsible for creating? (Reverse Coded)
All of it

Most

Some

Not much at all

How much discrimination against blacks does this organization feel there is in the United
States today, limiting their chances to get ahead?
A lot

Some

Just a little

None at all

This organization believes that generations of slavery and discrimination have created
conditions that make it difficult for blacks to work their way out of the lower
class. (Reverse Coded)
Strongly Disagree

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Strongly Agree

This organization believes that over the past few years, blacks have gotten less than they
deserve. (Reverse Coded)
Strongly Disagree

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Strongly Agree

This organization believes that over the past few years, blacks have gotten more
economically than they deserve.
Strongly Disagree

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Strongly Agree

